





Directorate of Intelligence



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Afghanistan Situation Report



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8 November 1983

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
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

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Government efforts to incite defections have not appreciably reduced the effectiveness or manpower of the resistance. The government could be more successful if it exploited insurgent infighting and destroyed food supplies in rural areas.



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


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PERSPECTIVE

AFGHANISTAN: DEFECTIONS FROM THE RESISTANCE [redacted]

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Soviet and Afghan Government efforts to incite insurgent defections over the last year have not appreciably reduced resistance military effectiveness or manpower and have been considerably undermined by a large number of redefections. Regime officials have attempted to bribe insurgents, tribes, and religious leaders to join the government, but most insurgent defections have resulted from military pressure, economic hardship, or infighting with other insurgent groups. Resistance organizations have been countering government efforts by assassinating defectors and destroying defecting groups. We believe Kabul's efforts will remain ineffective over the short-term, but over the long run cumulative military pressure and government efforts to exploit insurgent infighting could increase guerrilla defections. [redacted]

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Government Efforts and Successes

Government efforts to encourage insurgent defections appear to have had only modest success over the last year and, in our view, have not hurt resistance effectiveness so far. [redacted] at least 3,600 insurgents from 10 provinces defected to the regime between September 1982 and September 1983. During a press interview in Moscow last May, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Afghan Army claimed that 22 insurgent groups defected in the first five months of 1983. We estimate that about 10,000 full or part-time insurgents--or 10 percent of estimated total resistance forces--defected at least temporarily in the year ending in September 1983. [redacted]

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The Kabul regime has used a combination of methods to encourage individual insurgents or guerrilla groups to defect. [redacted]

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[redacted] the most common tactic has been to offer bribes to insurgents or to insurgent commanders so the latter will bring their entire group over to the government side. Afghan officials also have promised that defectors will not be harmed or imprisoned and that the regime will not interfere with culture and religion in the insurgents' local areas. [redacted]

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propaganda teams sometimes have included former guerrillas who tell villagers of good treatment by the regime and encourage other insurgents to defect. [redacted]

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We believe that Kabul has made considerable efforts to use defectors to improve the government's counterinsurgency capability. [redacted] defecting insurgent groups have been sent to aid police units around Kabul. In early 1983 [redacted] defectors were being formed into units under elite Afghan Army commando brigades. US Embassy sources indicate that during Soviet and Afghan operations around Herat City in the spring of 1983, a former insurgent commander identified for government authorities guerrillas and resistance supporters among captured civilians. [redacted] in mid- 1983 defectors were being used to teach Soviet and Afghan officers guerrilla tactics--knowledge that has proven valuable to regime forces during counterinsurgency operations. [redacted]

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In addition to encouraging insurgents to defect, Afghan officials also have tried to bribe tribal and religious leaders to cease their support of the resistance and back the Babrak regime. The government, [redacted] has concentrated these efforts among the Pushtun tribes along the border with Pakistan to try to reduce insurgent infiltration. [redacted] Afghan officials have offered to rebuild mosques and pay mullahs to reduce the religious leaders' support for the insurgency. [redacted]

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Insurgent Motives to Defect


We believe that many individual insurgents and some smaller groups have defected primarily because of a combination of military pressure and lack of food or the money to buy it. [redacted] insurgent desertions in the area increased following prolonged large-scale enemy attacks in early 1983. [redacted] insurgent defections have increased during winter because of food and shelter shortages. Resistance leaders in Peshawar, Pakistan, warned in early 1983 that government efforts to promote cease-fires and defections were becoming more effective in economically depressed areas. We believe that the destruction of crops and farms, and emigration of farmers because of military operations probably have increased food shortages, resulting in more insurgent defections in certain areas. [redacted]

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Infighting among rival insurgent bands, in our view, also has been a major cause of defections. [redacted]

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[redacted] defections of Hizbi Islami insurgent bands, of 100 or more men, increased in northeastern Afghanistan in early 1983. We believe that many of these groups have defected because Jamiat Islami insurgent forces have been consolidating their control in the northeast by attacking and driving out rival Hizbi bands. [redacted]

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[redacted] a major insurgent leader and his band defected because of a personal quarrel with other bands around Herat City in 1982. [redacted]

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Redefections and Insurgent Countermeasures [redacted]

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In our view, Kabul's success at fostering insurgent defections has been undermined considerably by the large numbers of guerrillas and insurgent group defectors who return to the insurgency. We estimate that about half of the insurgents who defected over the last year have redeffected to the resistance. In July 1983 defectors attacked Afghan Army forces in Badakshan Province and [redacted]

[redacted] killed 31 party members before rejoining nearby resistance groups. [redacted] three government units formed from defectors in early 1983 returned to the resistance in midsummer. We believe that the redeffection of former guerrillas attached to Afghan commando units contributed to the defeat of the Afghan 38th Brigade in Paktia Province in May 1983. [redacted]

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We believe that many insurgents deliberately defect to gain weapons, intelligence, or foment dissension among regime forces and then redeffect to the resistance. [redacted] one

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Afghan official was extremely worried in June 1983 because 3,000 insurgent defectors had recently rejoined the resistance after the government gave them 1,000 AK-47 rifles. [redacted]

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In August 1983 two "defectors" recruited three Afghan Army officers into the resistance, penetrated the local Afghan secret police unit, and later redeffected to the insurgency. [redacted]

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[redacted] resistance leaders have developed tactics they believe will gradually undermine government defection programs and will allow insurgents to keep the regime's bribes while remaining active in the war. The leaders have told guerrilla commanders to "accept" surrender offers, set up meetings with government delegations, take their money, and then kill the regime officials.

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[redacted] in late September 1982
insurgents in Nangarhar Province killed 200 members of a regime
negotiating team after taking a defection bribe of 10 million afghanis.
According to reports from the US Embassy, a Soviet and Afghan group sent
to negotiate the surrender of insurgent bands north of Kabul in
September 1983 met the same fate. [redacted]

To discourage defections and limit the damage caused by defectors,
resistance groups have assassinated some former insurgent leaders and
have destroyed a few defecting guerrilla bands. US Embassy sources
report that in March 1983 insurgents killed a defector who had appeared
on Kabul television, and that villagers burned his house and killed some
of his relatives. Other Embassy reports indicate that two months later
an insurgent bomb killed a guerrilla leader who had defected in early
spring. [redacted] the resistance has been
assassinating mullahs who have defected. In early July 1983, insurgents
destroyed a band of 40 former insurgents near Kabul [redacted]
[redacted]

Prospects

We believe that Kabul's efforts over the next year will not
appreciably increase the rate of insurgent defections and that guerrilla
groups will be able to recruit new members to make up for desertions and
casualties, and to provide for some increase in manpower. [redacted]
[redacted] in October 1983 [redacted] guerrilla groups throughout
Afghanistan have had large numbers of volunteers to replace casualties.
[redacted] however, [redacted] guerrilla bands have had difficulties
replacing weapons lost in battle. We judge that the loss of weapons
caused by defections is more likely to hurt the resistance than manpower
shortages. [redacted]

Although insurgent defections will provide the government with
intelligence on guerrilla activities and the desertion of groups will
temporarily reduce resistance activity in some areas, a continuing small
number of defections will not reduce overall resistance military
effectiveness. In our view, many insurgents will continue to follow the
traditional pattern of taking advantage of government defection offers
and then redefecting. Moreover, we believe that government attempts to
integrate defectors into Afghan security forces and the redefection of
some of these men will undermine regime control in many areas and could
lead to significant military defeats. [redacted]

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Over the long term, however, we believe government efforts could become more effective by exploiting infighting among resistance groups and the logistical weaknesses of many guerrilla bands. Continuing infighting among resistance groups and the loss of territory by one group, such as the Hizbi Islami, will provide the government with the opportunity to encourage the defection of large numbers of well armed insurgents who can be used to fight other guerrilla groups. Deliberate destruction of food supplies and farms in the fall and winter combined with offers of food or money would also increase defections. Although many deserters would redefect the following spring, continuing strong government military pressure and material incentives eventually would reduce the number of defectors willing to return to the war. 

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